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Abstract. A programming system is a language made from a fixed class of data abstractions and 
a seleciion of familiar deterministic control and assignment constructs. It is shown that the sets 
of all ‘before-after’ first-order assertions which are true of programs in any such language can 
uniquely determine the input-output semantics of the language providing one allows the use of 
auxiliary operators on its ground types. 
After this, we study programming systems wherein the data types are syntactically defined 
using a first-order specification language with the objective of eliminating these auxiliary 
operators. Especial attention is paid to algebraic specifications, complete first-order specifiications; 
and to arithmetical computation in the context of a specified programming system. 
Introducticm 
The idea that a general programming language, or a :!lpecialised programming 
system, PSP can be usefully defined by the axioms and rules lof inference underlying 
proofs of various properties of programs written in the language can be traced to 
Floyd [13]. As I-Ioare pointed out in [19], it is an attractive thesis for demanding 
that any implementation of Py be made to satisfy these a)Kioms and rules provide3 
a criterion for the correctness of its implementations and establishes a set of provable 
features for programs in PISP common to all its implement,ations: everything proved 
true of a program S in @sP will be true in each implem~r.ntation however the all 
important undefined features of 9??’ are handled. The acceptance of such a formal 
axiomatic system as authoritative in specifying the meaning of a language has been 
ad.vccated by several writers. For example, Dijkstra /Xl],, .lH[oare [20], Manna [23], 
I%are and Lauer [21]; and, of course, in Hoare and Wirth $1221 where Floydk’s idea 
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is applied to make a definition f~;. a part of PASCAL (see, in addition, Schwartz 
[32]). Despite its familiarity in the literature on program language design, Floyd’s 
thesis is, by the standards of the theoretical literature, as vague as it is intriguing: 
what proof systems for which properties of programs in what kinds of program 
languages can characterise semantics, and in which precise senses? It seems fair 
to say that, at present, as little is understood about the issues involved as was 
known about Hoare’s logic for proving program correctness before Cook took up 
hhat subject in his seminal study [S] (see [9] and the important survey article of 
Apt i:l],. 
This paper will settle upon one natural and precise formulation of Floyd’s principle 
and will study it in quite some technical detail. The program properties on which 
the specification method is based we take to be partial correctenress as this is 
formalised by first-order definable assertions. The semantics of a programming 
system we require to be defined uniquely up to the input-output behauiour of its 
programs, one of the standard measures of denotational semantics. Typically, we 
have i9 mind a programming system 99 with all the usual deterministic control 
and assignment constructs and whose data types are fixed independently by, say, 
procedures without side effects in some genera1 purpose programming language 9. 
This leads to a model of 9?Y in which program texts are represented by program 
schemes of some standard design PROG-for example, while-programs with 
counters :and stacks-and in which the data types are semantically given as various 
classes of interpretations for the primitives appearing in PROG. Each program S 
of $9’ will involve a finite collection C of constant and operator slymbols and se 
wiII belong to the set PRlOG(C) of programs in PROG having this signature 6. To 
PROG(C) is associated a class K of C-structures which we explicitly think of as 
representing the data type semantics of KY at least as far as the primitives in C 
are concerned. 
We are thus led, in Section 2, to define various partial correctness theories PCK (S) 
as sets of first-order partial correctness assertions about S true throughout the 
interpret’ations of K. We shall say that a (particular kind of) partial correctness 
trcleor!? determines the input-output semantics of the programming system 99’ if for 
each pair of programs S, S’ of p9’, admitting ir,terpretations throughout K, if 
PCK (S) = PCK (S’) then S and S’ compute the same partial function on each interpre- 
tation A E .K. And our paper will be taken up with investigating determinateness 
for various types of correctness theory and various classes of interpretations. 
From the point sf view of Floyd’s thesis, we make rapid progress: our first 
theorem (Section 3, Theorem 3.1) does indeed confirm in a precise, formal and 
respectable way, that there are _first-order partial correctness theories lavaila61e which 
delermine the input-output semantics of any deterministic programming s:ystem. As 
a result of this it can now be said that as iong as one can axiomatist* the uppropriate 
kind of correctness theory for a programming system then Floyd’s principle, in this 
formulation, is a theoretically realistic method for defining it. This pro1Jiso is, of 
course, the second hallf of the problem of making theoretical sense of Floyd’s 
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principle. And, as such, it is an almost indzpendcnt scwrce of hnany interesting 
problems about the existence, or non-existence, of sound and f;omplete kjoare 
logics for proving the partial correctness of programs relative to given classes of 
interpretaltlions. As will be made clear, the state of that particular art-as reported 
in Apt.‘s recent survey [l], for example-is nowhere near sufficiently well developed 
to service *this enquiry. BeLause of this, and other ramifications of the provisio, 
here we arle content to concentrate on the determinateness problem and more or 
less ignore axiomatiscltions. (Two of us have, however, begun to investigate Hoare 
logics for the partial correctness theories of highly specific programming, systems 
[S] and we will provide here some information about how perplexing the situation 
seems to be.) 
It now remains for us, in this introduction, to explain how a very general and 
reasonable solution to the determinateness problem fails to completely settle even 
that issue in Floyd’s thesis and how it leads directly to the powerful machinery of 
algorithmic logic which characterises the second half of our paper. The correctness 
theories employed in our 6rst solution have an irritating techniical defect: they 
include assertions which use operators which do not appear in the programs and 
whose semantics are extrinsic to that of the programming, systems as given. The 
problem of eliminating ‘hidden r”unctions’ from the specifying assertions forces us 
to be much more explicit about what the data type semantics t-If our programming 
systems really are and, in particular, how they are prescribed. In Section S, we 
make the assumption that the classes of interpretations ,which represent the data 
type semantics of programming systems have specifications written out as axioms 
in the first-order assertion languages. And we explain how this hypothesis embraces 
the algebraic specification methods for data types (ADJ [15]$ as well as the 
specification assumptions about data types which are implicit in studies of Hoare’s 
logic in the manner of Cook [9]. After a change cf correctness theory, we look at 
determinateness for programming systems with data type specifications and with a 
particular r,mphasis on those specifications used for algebraic definitions and used 
in the theory of Hoare logics. At this point, the model-theoretic nature of the 
problem of determinateness becomes clearly visible and it% solution becomes the 
business of algorithmic logic, In Section 6, we tackle determinateness for comguta- 
tions on the set of natural numbers w under the assumptit-!n that arithmetic is not 
semantically given outright, but must be syntactically specified as (part of) the 
semantics of a programming system. 
Our interest in Floyd’s thesis and its mathematical an;llysis we owe entirely to 
A.R. Meyer who invited us ([25]) to work on the problerll of determinateness in 
calses of the form K = ALG(C), the class of all structures of signature 2, where 
implicitly no conditions are placed on the data types on which the programs compute. 
Subsequently, Meyer and J.Y. Halpern independently, and exhaustively, analysed 
this sFeciad case ([26]) and a preliminary report on their work has already appeared 
[a$]. All readers of this paper are recommended [28] for a detailed exposition of 
the infornrlal issues involved in a theoretical examination of Floyd’s thesis based 
116 J.A. Bergstra, J. Tiuryn, J. V. Tucker 
upon the hypothesis that a general purpose progsam language should be modelleId/ 
by program schemes PROG(Z) and all interpretations ALG(Z)ti This view is not, 
however, the outlook of the present paper. As will be explained in Section 2, here 
we take the (mathematically) more general notion of a programming system as the 
basic object of study and model a general purpose programming language by the 
totality of all possible programming systems. The advantage, as far as Floyd’s 
principle is concerned, is a much sharper analysis of determinateness; the ‘disadvzn- 
tage’ is that the necessary layers of conceptual and technical complications ask as 
many new questions as they answer old ones. In any case, the mathematical results 
*&ill speak for themselves: our readers should have no difficulties in comparing 
them with those of Meyer and Halpern and connecting them with the early work 
of de Bakker [2] (see also the more recent paper by Hennessy [18]) on proof 
systems for program equivalence; or, more generally, to the field of algorithmic 
logic associated with Engeler [ll], and the Polish and American Schools [4, IY]. 
1. Programs and assertions 
Any of the common designs for deterministic program schemes will serve to 
model thrj: programs required in our study: flow charts; while-programs; recursive 
procedures; all with, or without, arrays, counters, boolean variables and the like. 
This is because with input-output semantics what matters is the class of functions 
defined on an interpretation, not the mechanisms involved in their computation: 
&e meaning of a program is to be the mapping it computes. If our work is to bear 
on Floyd’s thesis then it is necessary (and, ultimately, it is sufficient) that we are 
abie to consider program families which are sufficiently strong to compute on each 
interpretation A all those functions effectively calculable on A by means of finite 
deterministic algorithms. The appropriate generalised Church-Turing thesis is 
kr.own: among many disparate, yet equivalent, definitions of computability on a 
relational structure A in use in the literatures of theoretical computer science and 
mathematical ogic, the formula which is most familiar to the reader is the set of 
all frt,w charts with counters and arrays. From the point of view of mathematical 
logic, the key characterisation is, perhaps, Moscbc?vakis’ absolute prime computaM- 
ity in [SO] as it directly defines the minimal model of the axiomatic notion of a 
computation theory over A, see Fenstad’s monograph [12]. Between the f:wo 
subjects lie the effective dej%itional schemes and finite algorithmic procedures of 
Friedman [14] which we, the authors, favour. The former concept is the one chosen 
for Meyer and Halpern’s work [28], incidentally. (For a survey of research into the 
subject of a generalised Church-Turing thesis for general algebras see [29,34].) 
The point is that with input-output semantics we can leave unclefined the general 
class of deterministic programs PROG used throughout the paper thus allowing 
the reader to apply our results to the claas(es) of his or her choice. In addition, the 
reader is free to choose the Pull computational semantics of his or her program 
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formula from which its input-output semantics must be derived. The different ways 
of defining computational semantics are legion, of course: as well as the text-books 
on program schemes, Manna [24] and Greibach [16], we recommend de Bakker’s 
monograph on denotational semantics [3]. The interesting paper by Meyer and 
Greif [27] is useful for further guidance on issues involved in this ‘choice’ of 
computational semantics. 
To sum up, then, PROG represents some set of determinstic program schemes 
capable of defining all computable functions on any interpretation. We assume it 
closed under composition and if * then * else * fi statements and we will use it with 
the following notational c:,nventions. The syntax of PROG has 
Cl, c2, l l l as constant symbols; 
kfl, “fi, l ’ l as function symbols of k arguments; 
kR1, kR2,. . . as relation symbols of k arguments; 
Xl, x2, l l l as variables. 
But we reserve the right to abuse this notation by dropping the arities from function 
and relation symbols and by introducing y’s and z’s as variables, and so on. 
Each SE PROG is assumed to name certain variables as input variables and ai 
variable as an output variable; this fixes the arity of the function S computes over 
its various interpretations. By the signature of S E PRIG we mean the finite list 
C(S) of all constant, function and relational symbols appearing in its text. The set 
of all SE PROG of signature C we denote by PRGG(C). Thus, Se PROG(C>l 
defines a partial function on precisely those relational structures whose signatures’ 
certain C. Flor such a program S and interpretation A, if S names n input variables) 
and a E A” then by S(a) w(: ambiguously denote the computation of S applied to 
a czAn and the output value when. this exists; converging and diverging computa- 
tions are distinguished, as usual, by S(a)./, and S(a)? respectively. 
If P and Q are prog; Jms of signatures C(P) and C( 0) respectively, and A is a 
relational structure whose signature contains C(P) UC(Q) then P and Q are said 
to be A-equivalent, written P - =&, if for all a CA* either P(a)& and Q(w)& and 
P(a) = Q(a) or both P(a)? and Q(a)?. 
We take for granted that the reader has available, in his or her computational 
semantics for PROG, formal definitions of a state deazription in a computation S(a ) 
and of length of computation IS(a)1 and that the following basic facts can be proved 
(see [34]): 
1.1. Localify of Compwhtion Lemma. In any computa&m S(aI, . . . , a,,) all the 
elements of ,4 appearing in all the state descriptions of S(aI, . . . , a,) li2 within 
(al, l . . 9 a,), the subalgebra of A genemted by aI, . . . , a,, E A. In particular, if 
S(a1 9 * l ’ 9 a,,) converges then its output lies in (ar, . . . , a,). 
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1.2. Invariance Lemma. Let A and B be relational structures, of common signature 
r, isomorphic by 4 : .4 + B. Then for any S E PROG(C), C c I-‘, and any input 
a1 , . . . , a,, C ‘4 
4Sh,..., a,) =&c@al, . . . , <jsa,,). 
The first-order assertion language 9 is based upon the syntactic vocabulary of 
FROG and is assumed to possess equality as well as the usual logical connectives 
and quantifiers. The semantics of the formulae and sentences of 2? take tlheir 
standard definition in model theory, see Chang and Keisler [‘?I. Corresponding to 
PROG(C) we take 2?(C) to be the first-order sublanguage of 9 made from the 
constant, function and relation symbols appearing in the signature 2. 
Let S E PROG(C) have named input variables x = (xl, . . . , x,1 and output variable 
y. Let r be a signature extending C. If IY = a!(x) and p == p( _v) are formulae of 
9(f), having x and y as their free variables, then we can make a new kind of 
syntactic object, the so-called asserted program (&?{p}, the semantics of which is 
defin\ed thus: for A a relational structure of signature r, the asserted program 
((Y)S{P) is valid for A, written A+{a}S{@}, whenever At== a(a) for a E A” then 
either S(a).j, and Al=P(S(a)) or else S(a)?. In the obvious informal notation 
Al={&@} if, and only if, for all a E A”, 
A~cw(a)-*[(S(a)~APS(a))vS(a)tl. 
The following fact must be verified by the reader. 
1.3. DeEnability Lemma. Let S E PROG(C) have input variables x = (x1, . . . , x,) 
and output variable y. Then for each 1 E o there exists a quantifier-free formula 
COlUP&, y j of 2’(Z:) such tlza t for each relational structure A whose signature 
contains C, and for all a E A”, b E ,i, A I= COMPsJa, b), if, and only if, the computa- 
tion S(a) terminates in 1 steps or less and the output variable is valued at b. In symEols, 
A /= COMP&a, 6) if and onfy if, IS(a)! s 1 and S(a) = b. 
‘Rws, by choosfng a suitable polynomial OUT(x), each individual terminating 
computation of S can be defined by a quantifier-free first-order formula of 2(C) of 
the form 
COMP&) = C0MPs.l (x, J J A y = OUT(x) 
in the sense that for each A, and all a E A” 
A /= COMPs,l(a) if, and only if, IS(a)1 G 1 and S(a) = OUT(a). 
2; Programming systems and determinateness 
Algorithms are written in a definite program formalism and are designed to 
compute functions over a definite data type semantics. The equation 
algorithms = programs -I- data types 
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is a slogan implicit in this investigation in the sense that we use PROG(C) to fix 
the assignment, control and mernory mechanisms avallable for the encoding of 
algorithms while the semantics of the data type primitives named in C are fixed 
by a class K of relational structures of signature C or some extension r 3 C. 
A pair [K, PROG(X)] we call a programming system. 
This first model of programming s!&n;ms sees them as small scale program 
languages with a fixed range of data type primitives which are given an algebraic 
semantics. One can imagine that these programming systems are realised in some 
general purpose program language-by implementing their basic operators by 
functional procedures without side effects, for example. But nothing is actually 
assumed o-f their data types’ syntactic definition or abstract specification, at least not 
at this poi:nt in our paper. Incidentally, the meaning of ‘algebraic semantics’ here 
is exactly that in the current programming methodology literature: the sema;:ti’ :
of data types are modelled by many-sorted algebras. (Our decision to work with 
‘essentially’ single-sorted program languages and their single-sorted interpreMions 
is more a matter of notational convenience than technical necessity.) 
For S E PROG(C) and K a class of relational structures of signature r 3 2, the 
first-order partial correctness theory of § with respect to algebraic dara type 
semanitics K is defined 20 be the set of preconditions and postconditions for asserted 
programs 
PCK (S) = ((cY, /3): (Y, p E 9(f) and for each 1% E K, A I= {cy}S{fl)}, 
The second clause of the definition we abbreviate K \= (a}S{P}. 
For lD, Q E PROG(X), we say that P and Q are M-equivalent if for each /\ E K, 
.!‘=A Q. And this we abbreviate P=KQ. 
The fkst-orderpartia! correctness theories are suid to determine program equivalence, 
and theruf;ore the input--output semantics, for the programming system [K, PROGLV], 
if for every .P, Q E PRlOG(C) 
pCK(P)=PCIK(Q) implies P=KQ* 
This last prloperty is what we take as the principal technical issue in formulat- 
ing Floyd”s thesis and, mathematically, this paper is given over to its study for 
various K. We shall refer to it as the determinateness property for the system 
[K, PI?OG(X)]. 
.?. 1. Determinateness for a general purpose program language 
The correctness theories determine the input-output semantics of the general purpose 
program language PRIG if they determine the input-output semantics of evpf*y 
speciah’sed programming system it fathers. We take the “sum of the determinateness 
problem for all the [K, PROG(Z)] to be the determinateness problem for PROG. 
In this formulation,, the theoretical value of the determinateness property for 
PROG depends upon that of the formal model of a progr .Imming system. Since 
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we are not yet assuming any conditions on our data type classes, the current 
determinateness property for PROG is enormously strong: the correctness theories 
are asked to determine program equivalence for some far-fetched examples of 
programming system which PROG cannot implement. Nevertheless our fil*st 
theorem, Theorem 3.1, will establish determinateness for PROG at this level of 
generality and in an apparently reasonable way. Indeed, the main objection to relying 
on the type of correctness theory used in that result is its surprising power. 
It is more usual to see that semantical theory of PRO6 blased on the pairs 
[ALG(Z), PROG(X)] h w ere ALG(Z;) is the species of all C-structures; this is the 
path take11 by Meyer and Halpern [28], for example. We do not take up this option 
because it misrepresents the relationship between the programming systems and 
the general language in which they are realised. Moreover, we think it misrepresents 
the r&e played by data types in the proof theory that must be considered and so 
creates a misleading impression of the determinateness question for PROG. Of 
course, these issues can only be properly considered in the hindsight of section 4. 
2.2. Some examples 
Clonsider a programming system [K, PROG(C)] whose data type semantics has 
been defineId uniquely up to isomorphism, the case of singleton classes K = {A} 
containing all C-structures isomorphic to some representative structure A. This is 
one of the sttandsrd situations considered in the algebraic specification theory for 
data types where it is assumed that the semantics of a data type is modelled by an 
algelbra finitely generated -‘ly initial elements named in its signature; such structures 
are called minimal because they contain no proper substructures. It is very easy 
to show 
2.k Lemma. Let A be a minimal structure of signature C. The for any I?, Q E 
PROG(Z) 
PC&P) -= PC,,(QI implies P =A Q. 
An immediate corollary .af Lemma 2.1 is that the partial correctness theories 
determine program equivalence for PROG over the standard model of a:pithmetk 
N. N we take to be the structure with domain the set of natural numbers o, with 
t5e operations of successor, addition, and multiplication, with zero as distinguished 
constant, and w1 th the ordering of w as a basic relation. The signature of N we 
write Cari&. 
Lemma 2.1 also applies to the so called prime rings Z,, and Z, and the prime 
fields E, and Q. The fol,owing proposition is designed to generate some equally 
simple counter-examples to determinateness without minimality. 
Let K be ;I class of C-ctructures satisfying these two properties : there 
Z) such that 
Floyd’s principle, correctnew theories and program equivalence 121 
(i) for each A E K, S computes an automorphism of A, and 
(ii) there exist A E K and a E A where S(a) # a. 
Then the-first-order pargial correctness theories fail to determine program equivalence 
for PROG(C) over’K. 
Proof, Let P B>e the S hypothesised and let Q be a program for the identity map, 
Condition (ii) asserts that P +KQ and we shall show .PCK (P) = PCkY (Q). Assume 
for a contradiction that these sets do not coincide: let (cu, p) lie in P&(P) but not 
in E&2), say. Using the facts that p, 6 always compute total functions and that 
0 computes the identity we know that 
for each AEK, awl, At=++,Wa), and 
forsomeBEK,bEB,B&tkY(b)+fl(b). 
The second property irnplies B t= cy(5) A l@(b) and so we know that & l= cu(b) and 
B l#P(b), B l=@p(b). But P computes an automorphism 4 of B and since B is 
first-order we get a contradi&ion from the fact that 6 l=@(x) if, and only if, 
R I= pq5 (x) for any x. 
The second case, where (au, p) E PCK (Q) -PCK (P), is equally easy to check. 
Here are some examples where PROG(C) can be seen to loose determinateness 
on its straight-line programs. 
2.3. Finite fields 
Let F be a finite field of characteristic p. Then d(x) = xp is a field automorphism 
of F. If F is not Zp then 4 is not the identity. So take M to be any class of finite 
fields of characteristic p containing at least one GF(p”) folr n # 0,l; in particular 
take K = {GF(p”)} with n # 0,l. (Remember that PROG ii; determined over K = 
{Z,}.) See Parikh [31] i.n connection with this example,. 
2.4. Linear algebra 
An involution * of a (not necessarily commutative) ring j!? is an automorphism 
such that for all r E R, r** = r. Take .K to be any class of rings with involuti,lon 
containing at least one R where the involution is not the identity. For example, 
let K contain the complex number field C with complex conjugation a + ib + u - ib. 
Or let K contain the ring of 2 x 2 matrices over a field with the symplectic involutlion 
defined (z s)* = (-4 -i). 
The determinateness problem for programming systems of the form [A, 
PROG(Z)] does not admit the clear cut solution suggested by Lemmas 2.1 and 
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2.2, however. Minimality is, indeed, rln obvious condition to place on the interyreta- 
tions which arise in the study of data type semantics and specifications. It stands 
between the simple idea that one wants names in the signature C of a specification 
(2, E) of a data structure A for initial values which generate the structure A, and 
the concept of initiality (sayj which is a mathematical expression ot how (2, I?) 
specifies A : see ADJ [ 151. But it is misleading when one considers the specification 
theory o’r’ data types in the wider context of programming systems as is done in 
Sections 5 and 6. Therci: rninimality disappears because the semantics of the proof 
systems one needs depernds upon all the models of its specifying axioms ALG(C, E). 
The obviouls example is ordinary arithmetic. It is trivial to give a concise algebraic 
axiomatisation of N, but the proof theory one needs for arithmetic computations 
on IV is una~;oidably that based on Peano-like axioms as data type specifications 
and all their models as the data type semantics; Section 6 is devoted to this example. 
2.5. Technical prelimimMs 
The definition of K-equivalence consists of two clauses: ? =K Q if, and only if, 
(1) for each A E K and all 0 EAR such that P(a)i and Q(a)& P(a) = Q(a) in 
A, and 
(2) for each A E K and all a E A”, P(a)& if, and only if, Q(a)&. 
The first condition should naturally be called weak K-equivalence (cf. [24 ]), the 
second we call K-convergence equivalence. We denote these relations by =wK and 
= -_cK respectively. From these two notions we make two determinateness properties: 
The partial correctness theories are said to determine weak equivalence for 
PROG(C) over K if for any P, Q E PROG(Ej 
PC&$) = P&(Q) implies P=wKQ. 
The partial correctness theories are said to determine convergence equivalence 
for PROG(C) over K i, for any P, G E PROG(X) 
pCK (P) = PCK (Q) implies P ==x Q. 
2.3. Lemma. The program correctness theories determine program equivalence for 
PROG(Cj over K if, and only if, they determint?, both weak and convergence 
equivalence over K. 
Let A be a structure and let al, . . . y a,, E A. Then adjoining these elements 
al 9***9 a,, to A ads distinguished constants makes a new structure denoted 
(A, al,. . . 9 an). 
A closed program S is one without any Lninitialised variables. 
2.4. Convergence Lemma. Let K be a class of structures of common :;ignuture r 
and let C c I’. The following condition is sujJi<rient for the partial correctness theories 
to determine convergence equivalence for PROG(Z’j over K. 
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For any finite extension of C by constants, Z(c) = C v (c 1, . . . , en ), and for an:rI 
closed program S over Z(c), if S diverges on some algebra in K then there is a sentence 
6, first-or&r over Z(c), wriich is satisfied in some a!gebra in K and such that for an!1 
AEKand ax, . . . . a,EA, @&al,..., a,)i=8+Sf. 
hoof. Assuming the condition holds we are to prove that for any P, Q E PROG(2’) 
PCK (P) = PCK (Q) implies P SC&. 
So, contrapositively, suppose that P, Q are X-programs for which there exists A E K 
anda = (a.1, . . . , a,) E A” where P(a) converges but Q(a) diverges @a~). Let [ P(a )I =: 
t and define a new program abbreviated by 
S(X) = if COMP&) thcr; Q(x) eke STOP G 
Notice that S has signature C and, moreover, it does not require programming 
fe.atures beyond those assumed for P, Q. (This is because a straight-line pr’ogram 
over C can be written to decide COMPp,,(x).) 
Adding the new constants cl, . . . , cn to C we create the closed program S(c) 
over C(c) by replacing input variable xi of S with constant ci, 1~ i s n. By hypothesis, 
(A, al, l . . 9 a,)k S(c)?. And applying the condition we get al sentence 8 which is 
first order X(c) and K-consistent and which implies the divergence of S(c) 
throughout K. Let &(x) be Q with each constant cj replaced by variable xi, 1~ i s n. 
We claim: (&(x), false) E PCK (0) - PCK (P). 
The pair cannot lie in P&(P) because whenever 00(x) is true S(X) diverges and, 
by definition, P(x) converges and {&}P{false} is not true. On the other hand 
{&,}Q{false} is valid for K because (90(x) is true implies Q(X) must diverge. 
3. Determinateness via extended semantics 
Consider a typical programming system [K, PROG(X)] where K is any class of 
C-structures. Our first project is to show that a conservative and kformly de*finable 
extension of the assertion language and its semantics enables the partial correctness 
theories to determine program equivalence at this level of generality. 
Let Carittr ={0, SUCC, ADD, MULT, ORDER} be the signature of arithmetic 
assumed disj)oint from 2. A structure & of signature 2 u&-ith, is a (formal) 
adhmetical expansion of a .X-structure A if the C-reduct of B is isomnvphic to A. 
Let AE(K) denote the class of all arithmetical expansions of a:11 algebras in K. 
3.1. Basic extension eorem. Let K be any class of X-structures. Then for any P, 
Q E PROG(,X) 
PCAE&P) = PCAE&Q) implies P =~a3 
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Let us first consider the positive aspects of Theorem 3.1 and postpone our 
reservations until r;,fter its proof. 
This theorem is, indeed, a striking result in favour of Floyd’s thesis, especially 
when one sets the weakness of first-order assertion languages against the strength 
of PROG anId the generality of K. As far as the input-output semantics of PROG(X) 
i:i concerned, the two programming systems are identical: each SE PRQG(X) is 
interpreted by the same class of C-structures and over each such structure S 
computes the same function. If K is specified by first-order axioms over C, or if 
K is specified by algebraic aurioms in conjunction with initial algebra semantics 
(ADJ [HI), then, in both cases, precisely these axioms over C u Carith uniquely 
characterise AE(K). Indeed, Theorem 3.1 is ‘best possible’ in the sense that a 
result for arbitrary K cannot avoid the use of hidden functions in the assertion 
language; we have seen this in Lemma 2.2. And, in any case, it is known in the 
algebraic theory of data types that to specify all the data types one wants it is 
necessary (and sufficient) to use hidden functions from the language set aside for 
the purpose. 
In [28] the role of our Theorem 3.1 is played by their Theorem 4.1. 
Proof of the Basis Extension TImesrem. Let F, Q E PROG(Z). Observe that P =Q& 
if, and only if, P =:AE(K) Q: we shall prove that 
First consider convergence equivalence. By the Convergency Lemma 2.4, it is 
sufficient to examine closed programs ovei finite extensions by constants of C. Let 
S be a closed program over Z(c) where c = (cl,. . . , c,). Suppose A E AE(M) and 
that for al, _. . , a, E .A we have (A, al, . . . , a,) I= ST. We shall construct a sentence 
0 first-order over .X(c)uC arith which is satisfied on (A, ~1, . . . , a,) ar,ld such that 
for each B E AE(,K) and each bl, . . . , 6, E B 
64 b 1,...,b,)k@+Sf. 
Now if A is finite then the &substructure of A generated by al, . - . , a, is finite 
and can be defined, up to isomorphism, by a first-order sentence e(c) over X(c). 
This 8(c) is trivially satisfie,d on (A, al, . . . , a,) and, using the Locality Lemma 1.1 
and the Invariance Lemma 1.2, it is easy to show for any B E AE(K) and any 
61 , . . . , 6, E B that if (B, bl, . . . , b,) I-= t?(c) then (R, 61, . . . , b,)l= ST. Therefore, we 
may take O(c) to be 0. (Notice no hidden functions were required here.) 
Assume A is infinite. We define a unary formula N, first-order over xarith by 
N(x) = $1. sucq y) = x. 
M llhout loss of generalhty it can be further assumed of A that 
(i) AN -{aEA:Al=N(a)) is a xuCa,ith substructure of A and contains 
(al, l l l 9 a,,); in a nutshell, AN is a x(c) u Carith substructure of (A, al, . . . , a,,). 
(ii) The reduct ANlsaarith is isomorphic to 
Floyd’s principle, correctness theories and program tqwivalence 125 
This transformation is easy to arrange. First fix that (a 1, , . . y a,) (is or) lies in a 
countably infinite C-substructure X of A. Then define 0, SUCC, AID, MULT 
on X and A -X such that AN =X. 
Since (A, al,. . . , a,$= ST, for each t E w: Al I= -COIMP~,,(C). And the next step 
is to formalise an arithmetisation of COMP&z) in the first-order language of 
s(e) L.J Carith. For t E o we denote by t the terrn SUCC’(0) over .Zarith. 
3.2. Represent&ion Lemma. Let r be any signature and let {6,(x ): t E W) be a 
recursively enumerable sequence of open formulae of Z(F) wi!h variables x = 
(Xl 9**.9 x,). Then there exists a sentence !P and a formula 8( yy x) iu the first-order 
language of r v Carith such that 
(i) !I% true i:? any r u Carith structure A in which AN = (a E A: 3 y . SUCC( y) = a) 
is a I- v Carith suhstrucmre of A and ANirar,th r N; 
(ii) foreach tEo, W-N(X~)A~ l l ~N(x,)+[t?,(x)~8(r~~ x)]. 
We do not stop to prove this lemma as its argument is a rather straightforv”ard 
adaptation of the proof of the representability of the recursive functions in arith- 
metic. 
Applying the Representation Lemma 3.2 with I’ z= C(c) and 6, = -COMP&) 
we choase appropriate ‘p and 6( y ) = 0( y, c), first-order over Z(c) u Carith. By our 
choice of A, we can act from the lemma that (A, al, . . . , a,$== V and so 
(A, al, *. . 9 an)\= e(t, c)- 1COMP&). 
Therefore, (A, al, . . . , a&== O(& c) for every t E w. 
The sentence we require is 
gD~~Atly.[RT(y)-*(i?(y,c)1. 
We now verify the local condition of the Convergency Lemma 2.4. @ is clearly 
first-order over C (c ) v C&th and is consistent by its construction. Suppose 
&AAE(K) and bl,..., b,FB are such that (B,bI,...,b,j@=O. Then 
(R, bl, .a . l , b,) b= e(i, c) for all t and, using 
VI- e(t, c)- -COMP&) 
we may deduce that 
(B, bl, . . . , b,) I= AtEti lCOMJ’&) 
which means the program diverges. 
We now consider how rhe partial correctness theories determine weak 
equivalence for Z-programs over AE(K). 
Let P, Q E PROG(C) and let: A E AE(K). Suppose that for a = (a~, . . . , a,,) E A”, 
P(a) and Q(a) converge to distinct values. Taking IP( = k and lQ(a)[ = i we 
define the difierence formula 
DLFF(x) = COMPp_k(x) /\ COMPo,l(x) r\ OU F’.k (xl + ~rUTQ.f (r )* 
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It is now straightforward to separate the correctness theories of P and Q with the 
pair (Q, p) defined bv 
cy (x) = lDIFF(x) A i [S”‘(O) =: .xi-js 
i=l 
fl( y) = y = OUT1&“O’(0), . . . , Sfc”‘(0)) 
wherein f(i) = (pj)[aj = ai]. We leave to the reader the task of verifying (a, p) E 
PGAE(K#) but (a, p) g P(~AE(K)tQ))* 
Although we accept Theorem 3.1 as a respectable theoretical stattment about 
Floyd’s thesis we also see it as a reference point which dictates a refinement of the 
analysis to be in order. This refinement we orgunise around the question Under 
what circums;ances can the hidden functions be eliminated? It is the proof of the 
theorem itself which forces this opinion. The argument rests on the remarkable 
definability propert& of the recursive functions on the natural numbers: rather 
than internalising or imitating this number-theoretic machinery within the semantics 
of the programming system that is given, we have simply expanded the semantics 
to make use of it. (If we had applied this technique solely to the [ALG(X), PRGG(C)] 
then we would have obscured its power and, for that matter, its technical structure.) 
Undermining the satisfactory features of lE3asic Extension Theorem 3.1, documented 
prior to its proof, is the feeling that stronger, and still fairly general, results are 
possible and that, in particular, these results would be more illuminating even if 
they are no more conclusive 3s far as the viability of Floyd’s principle is concerned. 
C:ertainly, Theorem 3.1 seems to say as much about the power of the recursion- 
theoretic equipment as it does about the semantical problems involved. 
4. Eliminating hidden functions 
This section is devoted to proving the following theorem, the most difficult to 
be found in our paper. 
4.1. Theorem. Let C be any signature except one containing exclusively unary 
relations arrd at most one unary function symbol. Then for any P, Q E PROG(X) 
PCALGd’) = ‘PC ALG(L)!Q) imphs p ‘ALGw 0. 
Mathematically, Theorem 4.1 represents the fate of the plausible observation 
that one has only to internalise the arithmetic mechanisms, seen in the proof of 
Theorem 3.1, to rid oneself of the hidden functions: it can almost be done, but only 
when there are no requirements placed on the data type semantics. To this we add 
the conjecture 
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4,X. Conjecture. For those signatures of the kind explicitly ruled out in ,the hypothesis 
of Theorem 4.1 the conclusion of that theorem is false. 
Those readers who prefer to conceive of the semantical theory of PRQG as being 
determined by programming systems [ALG(Z), PRQG(Z)] should attach quite 
some weight to Theorem 4.1 and to the open problem represented by Conjecture 
4.2. (Remember: any program naming only the constant zero, the: successor func- 
tian, and some unary boolean conditions for an arittl -zi3,tical co!:nputation is left 
uncovered by Theorem 4.1.) Although the theorem tias less be’aring on Floyd’s 
principle in the context of our own analysis, its proof :,s of great technical interest 
when contrasted with the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Theorem 4.1 appears, in a slightly weaker form, as Theorem 7.2 in [28]. 
Prcrof of Theorem 4.1, The plan of the argument is this. We begin by proving 
determinacy for weak equivalence. The proof of determinacy for convergency is 
based upon the Convergency Lemma 2.4 and it divides into a singular case, in 
which G contains one unary function symbol and some constants, and the usual 
one of those signatures remaining. The argument for the usual case is, indeed 
involved and we take it next leaving the singular case as a loose end to conclude 
the section. 
4.3. Lemma. Let C be a signature containing at least one function symbol. Then lhe 
partial carrectness theories determine weak program equivalence on A.LG(C). 
I+&, Suppose there is a C-structure A and a = (al, . . . 9 Q,! E A” such that P(a) 
and Q(a j converge to distinct values. Let IP( = k and )Q(a)l = 1 :lnd define l.he 
diflerence formula 
DIFF(x) = COMPp,&) A COMPQJx) P\ BUTp,k(x) # OUT&x), 
where x=(x1,..., x,). It is sufficient to make a first-order definition over C of 
some x =(x1,, . . . , x,j for which DIFF(x) holds throughout ALG(C) and to shd3w 
consistency. ‘We will construct unary formulae (B1, . . . , & such that 
n n 
@(x) = /\ 4i(xi) A 3x1, . . . 3 xn . /\ 4i(xi) A DIFF(x) 
i=l i=l 
is consistent. This done, it is easy to check that the pair ((w, p) defined by 
n 
~(x)EcD(x), P(x)E~x~, . . l 9 us, . /\ 4i(Xi)Ay =~UTJJ,~(X) 
i=l 
lies in PCz (k’) = PC ALG~z)($) but not in PC_dQ) = PCAI_G&Q)- 
We will first construct a C-structure B which is to witness the consistency of @. 
Let f be a k-arv operation of A. The structure B is simply A with this operation 
f redefined along its diagonal. 
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The computations P(a) and Q(a) take place within the subsystem (a) of A 
generated by a = (al,. . . , a,) E A” (Locality Lemma 1.1). Let X c (a) be the set 
of all elements appearing in either of these computations. Now choose some 
u E A -X and $z(n + 111 distinct elements {bii: 1~ i <j s n} from 161 -X u(u). 
Define g:Ak+A by 
f(Yl,***, 
I 
Yk), if Yi#yi fOrSOme lai,jsn, 
aj, if Y = bii, 
fiY,* l l v y), ifyEXandf(y,...,y)EX, 
Sl Yl ,-ryk)" I 4 ifyEXandf(y,...,y)&X, 
if y = U, 
otherwise. 
Replacing f by R in A makes B. We now leave to the reader the task of verifying 
what remains of the proof on taking 
4.4. Eelmnaa for the usual cases. Let C be (a finite extension by constants of) a 
signature containing at kast two functions or at least a function of arity greater than 
one or a unary fmction and a relatiore of arity greater than one. Then for any closed 
program S 0,ver Z, if for some A E ALG(Z) A I= S j’ then there is a sentence 4, first-order 
oaer C, which is consistent with ALG(Z) and such that ALG(C) I= 4 + ST. 
P~roof. The proof of the lemma is based upon the argument for convergency in the 
proof of the Basic Extension Theorem 3.1 where arithmetic syntax is adjoined to 
obtain K-consistent formulae implying divergence for closed programs throughout 
K. The pleasant feature: there is that the arithmetic required in no way interferes 
with the computations considered since the programs make reference only to 
operations prescribed for K. Here, however, we are to make avaiilable comparably 
strong, but internal, mechanisms. Our techniques to do this have some set theory 
in the r&e of arithmetic and will make full use of the freedom to manoeuvre, 
model-theoretically, characteristic of ALG(2). 
We will formulate the machinery in general terms using a 2-sorted first-order 
language destined to bz interpreted in L(2) with the result that the bulk of the 
proof *will then rest on Lemma 4.5 about its specification and its interpretation. 
After Lemma 4.5 we have tto show that each signature C admits an appropriate 
interpretation, atask which depends on the comp&tion of the signature and cannot 
be made uniform. 
Let r be any single-aorted signatllre. This we expand to a 2-sorted signature r2 
by adding to r a new sart called SET, and renaming by DtOM the! Qriginal (implicit) 
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sort of r, together with the binar-; relations E and CODE of sorts SET x SET and 
SET x DOM respectively. Given A E AEG&) we denote by AIDoh the I’-reduct 
of A andby AI SET the {SET, &}-reduct of A. . 
The first-order language L(fz) over r2 has two kinds of I ariables 
xp, x?, . . . and x;, xz, . . . 
ranging over sorts DOM and SET respectively although we drop the superscripts 
whenever confusion seems unlikely. We assume, for brevity, the languages L(r) 
and L(&) use only the colnnectives i v and the quantifier 3. 
Now an interpretation of L(&) in L(r) is determined as SOWS asI formulae of 
L(r) are chosen to define predicates for each sort and to deffine the relations E 
and CODE. Suppose we are given four formulae of L(r), say tlhe list I’= 
{Q,(x), Qs(x), Q, (x, y), Qc(x, y)}. This list I determines ;an interpretation 
I-f’ : L(&) + L(r) in an obvious way: 
H’(X”) = X2ip 
H’(Xf) =XZi+l, 
H’(f(t1, l l l 9 t,d =f(H’(tl), . . .v H*hh 
H*(x; E x;) = Q,(Ht(x;), H”(x;)), 
H’(CODE(x$, t)) = Q, (H’ (2 )9 H’(t)), 
Ht(@ v Y) = Hz(@) v HI(1Jp), 
HI(+)= lHz(@), 
H’(~x” l @)=aXzi l (QD(xz~) AH’(@)), 
H’(~x:. @) = 3Xzi+l l (Q~(xz~+I~ A Hz(@)) 
where f is a k-ary operation of k, t, tl, . . . 9 tk are r-terms; and <t5, 9 are formulae 
of L(&). 
We are able to prove Lemma 4.4 for precisely those signtitures Z which admit 
interpretations H’ satisfying the hypothesis of the followiilg 
4.5. Lemma. Let 0 be a sentence of L(r) and let fiW’ be an 
into L(r) which together satisfy these two conditions : 
(1) given any closed program S over r which diverges on 
exists a _l%tructure A where A k 6 and A t== St; 
general emma. 
interpretation of L (& ) 
some I‘structure there 
(2) for any sentence ?P of L(&) whenever 8 h !P is consistent wtth respect to 
ALG(&) then H”(@ A P) is consistent with respect to J&G(I). 
Then given any closed program S over P” which diverges somewhere in ALG(r) there 
exists a sentence 4 of L(r) which is consistent with respect to ALG(T) and 
ALG(r) I== q5 + Sly. 
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Proof. Let S be a closed program over r diverging somewhere in ALG(r). By 
condition (1) we can choose an A E ALG(r) on which S diverges and A I= 8. Let 
J!4(@) be the subclass of ALG(r) composed ocl those algebras satisfying 8, Using 
the arguments for convergence in the proof of the Basic Extension Theorem 3.1, 
we m;ty find a sentence 40, first-order over r u Carith, such that 
and dQ is there consistent. 
Frcjm b0 YV(: shall construct a sentence @ of L&) such that 
(i3 @ is) .4!.LG(~J consistent and AlLG(&) I= @ + ST. 
There d , i - H’$J A d)) is ALG(I*) consistent, by condition (2), and we may take 
~,b, = H‘ !6 n @) and prove 
(ii) ALG(r) c= 4 + St 
which completes the argument for the lemma. 
First of all let us prove this latter statement (ii) assuming @ to have been 
constructed and that it satisfies statement (i). 
Suppose A E AL@(r) satisfies C#I =Hz@ A @). We extend A to a &structure B 
by adding {a E ,4: A I= Q&x)} as a set-theoretic domain and defining E and CODE 
for B and Q,. Now for every sentence S E: I&) 
B I= 6 if, and only if, A I==: H’(S). 
Therefore, B I= 16 A Cp and, by condition (i), B I= ST which means 
Applying Hz to this formula, and using the fact that H’(lCOMP& = lCOMI&, 
we deduce A f==: St.
We now construct @ from C#J~ and prove statement (i). Here is a technical lemma 
whose proof is a tedious exercise in axiomatic set theory which we take the liberty 
of omitting. 
4.6. Lemma. ,Let Q be a finite sigrr9ature and let S be a sentence of L(A). Then there 
is a sentence p and a ;‘brm ala q(x ) of the first-order language of Zermelo-Fraenkel 
set theory L(ZF’) such that 
(a) ZF!=p; 
(b) ifS I=p then for b E tr, B I= c; (b) if, and only ih b is a A-structure which satisfies 
the sentence S. 
This lemma we apply to ~1 == r \J Carith and S := 40 A 8 to obtain appropriate p and 
qfx). Let p be a senten;se, first-order over _&, which expresses the following 
property oi a &-structure .B: 
If p and 3x . q (x:1 are true of B then for some b E B/SET, q(b) holds and 
CODE restricted? to {b’ E EisE~: b’ E b} x BIDoM is the graph of a r- 
issmorphism b -, .B II,oM. 
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We set @ =rp /! 3x . q(x) A ?P and aim to show this @ is A.LG(rz)-colnsistent and 
that ALG(r2) i= @ + ST. 
Consider consistency. Wz seek a &structure C satisfying Qi. For that part of 
C of sort DOM we choose any .B E ALG(r uZari*h) such that 18 t= 40. For the 
set-theoretic part of C we take any model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory contain- 
ing an element r5 which is in fact a r UC aritr,-structure isomorphic to B. And, to 
complete the colnstruction of C, we define CODE as the graph of any function 
which restricted to b is a Nsomorphism b + B. It is eaisy toi verify C I= @. 
Consider divergence. Let A be any &structure with A I== 18 A @. Choose u E AlsET 
such that AJ=q(#!& AsA/=p we know&z is aruC .,jtt,-structure which satisfies &. 
AS ALG(T’uCarith)nM(e)~~04S~ we know a Hf. But CODE, under these 
hypotheses, represents an isomorphism a + A f DaM and, therefore, S diverges on A. 
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.5. 
To complete the argument for the usual cases is a matter of defining interpreta- 
tions di’ for the various signatures and proving true of then1 the two hypotheslis of 
Lemma 4.5. We give two representative cases: 
(i) C contains one binary function f and a constant c. Here take 
8=3x, y . [x #y nVx .3y(fiy, y)=x)], 
Q&)=3y l f(Y,Y)‘% 
Q&F +y l f(Y, y)=x, 
Q&, y)- =f(y, YI* 
(ii) C contains two unary functions f, g. Here take 6 E Vx 3y . f ( y ) = x 
Let Q(x)=+y. f(y)=x anddefine 
QsW=~y. KXyhfYyb=x), 
Q&d = 1 Q(x) A 1 Q&b, 
Qh, y)=f(x) = y* 
4.7. Lemma for the singular case. Let C be (a #zite extension by constants of) a 
sigmture containing exactly one unary function and let K be any class of X-algebras 
which is closed mder takiriig suhal’geliras. Then for any closed program S 0vk.r C, if 
for some A E KA I= Sj’ then! there is a sentence q5, first-order ouer2, which is cnnsi%ent 
with K and such that K I= C$ + ST. 
Proof. Assume S = S(c) is a closed program over C involving c = (1~1, . . . , c’,,) and 
that A E K is such that A I= St when cr is interpreted by a - (a 1, . . . . o,,). VVe: make 
a special decomposition of the subalgebra (al, . . a 9 a,) of A. For f the unary 
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operation of A and for any a E A and k E w define 
orbk(f9a)={h~k3i~k,fi(a)=b} 
and then 
orb(f, Q) = kvm orbdf, a). 
Thus, (al,. . . , a,,:# = orb(f, al) v 9 l l u orb( f, a,). There arises just a few possible 
types of orbit in this decomposition of interest to us, illustrated in Fig. 1: 
(i) orb(f, ai) is finite, 
(ii) orb(fl ai) is infinite and meets no other orbit, 
(iii) orb( f, ai) is infinite but intersects scme orb( f, aj). 
In this third case notice that if b E orb( f, ai) n orb( f, aj) then f’(Ui) = b = f”(aj) for 
Fame r, s and hence for all k, f”k(ai)=f”‘k(aj)* 
case (i) *L* 
--W--7 
k0 
case (ii) 
case (iiij 
w 
i+ 
Fig. 1. 
-----___- 
Choose ko so large as to bound the cardinalities of the finite orbits and the finite 
parts of intersecting orbits which remain distinct; set 
u = kg orb& (f, ai)= 
0 
isn 
We aim to represent this subalgebra structure in a first-order sentence over 2. 
Let U be defined by the formula 
U(X) = V X =fi(Cj). 
is&o 
jstt 
LetR define all equalities and inequalities in U in this way: set 
f’(c,) =f’Ic,), 
“(” ” ” ‘) = 1 f i(cP) Z f’(c,), 
if fi(ap) = f’(a,) in A, 
otherwise. 
Then 
R z A T(i, j,p?q). 
i.jeko 
i,qsrz 
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Let 
~=(VX)[~~(X)+~(X~#XA ~uif!~!! 
AVY,Z. [f(y)=f(z)=x+y=YJ]. 
And choosing those aAl, . . . , aA, such that for all b E U, f(b) Z ah, (1 l s i s t) we define 
v = A vx . [f(x) #C&]. 
I 
ist 
Let 4 = R A W A V. VVe claim (b to be K-consistent and that K b 4 + ST. The 
consistency oB 4 follows from its construction from (al, . . . , a,) and the hypothesis 
that subalgebras of K-algebras are again K-algebras. To obtain .K t== 4 -3 ST one 
proceeds as follolws. Let B E K and B I= 4. Let B’ be the subalgebra of h? generated 
by the elements of B named by the constants in S. One can now show that B’l=:q5 
implies B’ is isomorphic to (a 1, . . . , a,,). Therefore, S diverges on B’ by Invariance 
Lemma 1.2, and so B i= ST by Locality Lemma 1. ‘81. The proof of the isomorphism 
we leave to the reader. 
Given some sympathy for our conception of a programming sys~~l, the methods 
used to internalize the hidden operators of Theorem 3.1 which g;n into the proof 
of Theorem 4.1 can be seen as an abuse of the semantical c0mponent.s of Floyd’s 
thesis. Underlining our reservations about modelling the semantics of PROG 
through [ALG(Zj, PROG(X)] is the fact that this view of a general progra,mming 
language sees these techniques as quite acceptable. 
5. Floyd’s principle and programming systems with specifications 
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we have achieved our first objective of Iprovi,ding a fairly 
thorough account of the determinateness problem for a liberal model of a program- 
ming system and, by extension, for a liberal formulation of the determinateness 
problem for a general purpose programming language. Certainly, with our current 
definitions, we have exhausted the implications of the de:terminateness problem 
for Floyd’s thesis. We are now to start on a second analysis, one which forgets 
about general programming languages (and so parts company with. [28]) and is 
carefully tailored to specialised programming systems. Of course, we know from 
our Basic Elxtension Theorem 3.1 that some hidden functions in the assertion 
language and an expansion of the data type semantics of the programming system 
will settle the problem at once. Our objective here is to think through the issues 
without recourse to the remarkable, but extrinsic, powers of recursion-theoretic 
definability theory. Instead, we will take as a guide certain reasonable assumptions 
about modelling a programming system with a limited field of alpplication. Our 
main idea is that the data types of such programmtng system must be syniaacfically 
specmified and that it: specification (IT:, E) has an essential role to play in the 
construction gf any proof theory for partr’al correctness oj’ the system This new 
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parameter, the specification, allows us to search for new information about Floyd’s 
principle through more delicate mathematical experiments in the style of algorithmic 
logic. 
In the penultimate section, we present a new technica. exegesis of the determin- 
ateness problem which is designed to overcome the hastjr counter-examples associ- 
ated with Lemma 2.2. After this, we encorporate specifications into the models of 
programming systems and prove some basic results iabout determinateness in these 
new systems. In the last subsection, we carefully analyse several programming 
systems made to handle arithmetical computations. 
5.3. The determinateness probkm for programming systems revisited 
We circumveni Lemma 2.2 with a new definition of partial correctness theories 
taken from [24, p. 1641. 
Let S E PROG(X) have named input variables x = (xl, . . . , x,) and output variable 
y. For ar = (Y(X) and p = @(x, y), formulae of Z(Z) having x and y as their free 
variables, wz call {~)S{fi) an i/o asserted progyam-ii/o reads input-output, of 
cuurse-the semantics of which is defined by 
A i= (LY )S{p} if, and only if, for all a E A”, 
where A is a C-structure. 
For S E PROG(C) and K a class of C-structures, the new first-order i/o partial 
correctness theory of S over K is defined to be the set of preconditions and poatcondi- 
tions for i/o asserted programs 
L/O-P& (S j = {(a, @): Q, @ E L?(Z) and for each A E KY A I= {cy}S{$}}. 
Let us postpone any comments on this modification until we have seen what it 
achieves. Lemma 2.2 now disappears from the discussion: 
5.1. T’erminaticsr, Lemma. Let K be any class of C-structures, If P, Q E PROG(C) 
defme total functions on each A F K then 
I/O-pCK(P)=I/Q-PCK(Q) implies P=KQ* 
Proof. Suppose P= KC? and let A EK, a EAT be such that P(a) f Q(a) in A. 
Assume P(a) terminates in d steps. By the Definability Lemma 1.3, we can encode 
the computation P(a) into the formula COMP&) and polynomial OUT&) over 
9(C) so that folr any b E A”, A k COMP&b) if, and only if, fP(b)l s t and P(b) = 
OUT,,(b). Define 
It is easy :o check that (true, 0(x,, y 1) lies iii I/O-PC&P) but not in I/O-P&(Q). 
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Thus, the i/o correctness theories determine the se.mantics of the everywhere 
terminating plro,grams od any programming systesl (withoJ.lt recourse to hidden 
functions). Imleled, whtn the two kinds of correctness theory are compared, one 
finds that it is the issues to do with convergence which distinguish rhern. 
LeM={(a,@): a = CY (x), /3 = p(y) E Z’(Z)} the set of ,a11 precon-tlitions and post- 
conditions for assertions. Then 
PCr5: (S) = I/OPCK (S) n ti 
and so 
5.2. Lemma. Let K be any class of C-structures. For any P, Q cz X%OG(Z), if 
I/O-PC&P) =I 1,/O-P& (0) then PC&P) = PCK (Q). 
That the converse of Lemma 5.2 is false follows from Lemma 2.2 and 5.1, of 
course. The following basic corrections between ttle correctness theorie:;-all to 
do with termination properties -we prove in an appendix. Recall the Convergency 
Lemma 2.4; this now becomes 
5.3. Localisation Lemma. Let K be any class of C- structures. T/W _~~ollowi;zg state- 
ments are eqkvalent : 
(i) for all P, Q E PROG(C), 
I/O-P&(P) = I/O-PC&?) implies P=KC!; 
(ii) *for any jnite extension of C by constants, C(cl = 2 U{CI, * . . ) cn 11, and for any 
closed program S over C(c), if S diverges on Some algebra in K then mere is a sentence 
8, f:rst-order over C(c), which is satisfied in some algebra in K and such thL;:t for any 
AEKandaI ,..., a,EA,(A,aI ,..., a,)l=t?*S~. 
In stating tile next results we bring in the i/o total correctness theories: let K be 
any class of E-structures and let S E PROG(Z). Define 
I/O-‘l&(S) = {(q 6): for all A E K, a E A”? 
A+oW-,CS(a)+[S(a)Q. @(a, SW)lh 
5.4. Lemma. Let K be any class of C-structures. -For any P, Q E PRCjG(E), if 
I/O-T&(P) := I/O-T& (Q) then 
PC&P) = PC,(Q; if, and only if I/O-P&(P) == I/O-UP&. 
5.5. Lemma,. There exists a class K and programs P and Q for which 
I/G- PCK (Pj = I/O-P& (Q) but I/O-T&(P) f I/O-‘I& ( Q). 
The decision to use the PC&j’s, at the start of our investigation wa:. made so 
as to conform with the standard practice of the literature on partial correctness 
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(Apt [l]); and these are the correctness theories used1 by Meyer and Halpern [28]. 
The change to the i/o correctness theories is dictated by Lemma 2.2, but it hardly 
represents a less natural means of formulating Floyd’s principle to require asserlions 
$0 remember inputs when speaking of outputs. Meedl, Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3 szggest 
the opposite to be true. We should also say that using i/o correctness theories from 
the beginning would only have weakened our Basic Extension Theorem 3.1 and 
made not a guild&s worth of difference to the difficulty of proving Theorem 4.1 L 
5.2. Programming systems with specifkations 
We are now going to consider programming systems [K, PROG(X)] with K a 
class of C-structures syntactically defined by a set of axioms from a data type 
specification language. This language we take to be Z(C) with its usual senzztics 
in modei theory, that based on Tarski’s notion of satisfaction. Thus, our program- 
ming systems will be entirely syntactic objects of the form [(Z, E), PROG(S)], 
where E is a set of sentences of g(Z), and their input-output semantics will be 
based on K = ALG(C, I?), the class of all C-structures satisfying the axioms in E; 
such K are called first-order axioJmatisable classes. 
How does this description connect with those of the literature on the syntax and 
semantics of data types? All current work on data type specification uses ffirst-order 
specifications (X, E) and their semantics ALG(X9 E). However, it is there common 
to want to define the meaning of (C, E) as a particular structure in ALG(C, E), 
unique up to isomorphism. This arises quite naturally from the widely held informal 
view of data types as objects composed of different kinds of data domains on which 
are prescribed a number of primitive operations: the meaning of a data type 7 
becomes an algebraic structure A(T) and a specification (Z, E) of type T is accepted 
as correct if its semantics is an a!g&ra A@, E) isomorphic to A(T). At best, iogical 
semantics is able to define structures uniquely up to elementary equivaknce only 
and this is far weaker than isomorphism. Thus, in working with data type 
specification problems in isolation, one refines the satisfaction semantics of (X, E) 
to (usually) its initial algebra semantics (ADJ [lS]) and (sometimes) its final algebra 
semantics ([6, 351) whose purpose it is to pick out a structure from ALG(Z, E) as 
the meaning of (2, E). The nature of these new semantic mechanisms need not 
concern us here though it is useful to point out that they impose conditions on the 
syntactical structure of the axioms E the axioms are usually required to be equations 
or conditional equations. (A partial explanation of this is Corollary 3.2.5 in [7].) 
The crucial point, then, in assessing the relevance of our treatment of data types, 
lies not with the essentially algebraic problem of the correctness of data type 
:-pecifications, but with the logical problem of proving partial correctness for 
programs relying on these specifications, independently of whether they are correct 
or not.. 
M&thLematically, the proof theory of partial correctness for [(Z, E!, PROG(Z)] 
must be builit up from first-order components: assertions from S(S) with the axiom 
oracie for the Rule of Consequence taken as Thm(S, E), the set of all sentences 
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of Ore(X) provable from the axioms of E by the rules of !irst-order logic. Whatever 
the . data type sIerna;.‘stics intended for the programming system thuough the 
specification (2, E) might be, the proof theory For partial correctness is obliged to 
deal with the satisfaction semantics ALG(C, E) as that of the programming system. 
Our formal model of a programming system allows an equally perspicuous 
description of the standard treatment of Hoare’s logic initi;rted by Cook [2] where 
the words data type and specification am not mentioned. There, one gives general 
rules of inference from the control structures of PROGiJ’) and completes the 
construction of the proof system by fixing an interpretation A and taking Th(A) 
a.s the axiom oracle for the Rule of Consequence. This corresponds toI our descriplion 
of the canonical Hoare logic of the programming system [(I$ Th(A)), PRGG(Z)] 
where Th(A) acts as a data type speciflcation. But the semantics of (2, Th(z4 !) is 
Iyot the singleton class {A}; it is the class ALG(C, Th(&j which contains many 
structures not isomorphic to A. The fun&mental example of this is proviided by 
tile standard model of arithmetic N, of course. 
To return, for a moment, to the situation for algebraic specifications, the best 
that can be arranged is a partition of the, specification into an algebraic part (C, &I) 
which correctly defines the data type semantics A, uniquely up to isomorphism by, 
say, initial algebra semantics, togethz: wit”;:-a proof theoretical part (C, EL ) chosen 
to make up the proofs of the correctness of programs of interest. Tlnis EL must 
be a subset of Th(A), and for the int:ended system [A, PRQG(C j] the strongest 
proof theory possible wili be that of [AI_G(E, Th(A)), PRQG(X)]. 
So it is then, that the study of the determinateness problem must contend with 
complex model-theoreti-: classes as representing the semantics of data types even 
when addressing computations on essentially simple minded data types such as 
arithmetic. 
We will lncw consider determinateness for program!iTring systems with 
(1) arbitrary first-order data type specifications; 
(2) algebraically styled specifications; and 
(3) complete first-order specificatii)ns which cover the (2, Th(A)) specifications 
described above. 
5.3. General first-order specifications 
The i/o correctness theories fail to determine program equivalence not only for 
the first-order specified programming systems in general1 Ubut tor those with a”lgebralc 
specifications and for those with complete first-order sIpecitications. Thus, here we 
begin by proving a useful structural f:act about the determinateness problem. 
5.6. Cauntahililty CC~L~~. Lc: X v_ ;: ji:, ‘* r z-arder aximnatisable cl~i.~.~ of C-stwctwes 
and let KC, bz the sublcass of K com.pczd of a/l its courzl’rlble stw:tures. The,u for 
any P, Q E: PRGG(C) 
I’ =KO Q if., and only if, P zKQ. 
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Moreover, for any S E PROG(C), 
r/o-PC,,(S) = I/O-PC&J~. 
To obtain this we look again at the local structure of computations. 
Let K be any class of C-structures. A C-structure A is said to be locally a 
K-structure if each finite subset of ,4 is contained within a X-substructure of A 
which belongs to K ; write L(M) for the class of all locally K-structures. 
5.7. Lenmna. Let K be a class of C-structures. TI;len for P, Q E PROG(2) 
P qStKb Q if, and only if, P =KQ. 
Proof. Now f = L(K)( Q implies P =KQ because K c L(K). Conversely, assume 
P =KQ. Let A E I% and consider an arbitrary computation of P, Q on a = 
(al,..., a,, ) E An. If B is a substructure of A containing {a 1, . . . , a,} then, by the 
Locality of Computation Lemma 1. f , 
P(a) =.A Q(a) if, and only if, P(a)sgQ(a j. 
Thus, P=KQ implies P =L(K~ Q. 
Proof of tennma 5.6. Obviously, P =KQ implies P = ~~ Q as & c K. By Lemma 
57, P ==-“K~ Q implies P sLCKOJ Q: we show that K CL(&). Let A EK and 
ai Y*‘** LZ~ E A. From a Downward Liiwenheim-Skolem argument (for example, 
Theorem 2. i .6 iri [7]), we may deduce there is a countable elementary substructure 
‘40 of A containing al,. . . , a,, which is a K-structure as K is axiomatisable. Since 
A. E K. we have that A E L&J. 
With regard to the last statement of the lemma, note that I/O-PCK(S) c 
T/@PC,KJS) because K0 c K. Assume for a contradiction that (CY, 6) lies in I/O- 
PC&Q but not in I/O-PC&S). Consequently, there is A E K and a E A” such that 
A I= c{(a) and P(a),/, but A I+ P(a, P(a)). Since P(a)& we! can first-order express this 
computation: 
/1+ “ZOMF&) + --@(x, OUT&)). 
Again by lthe Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, there is a countable elementary sub- 
structure A* of A where 
From this it follows, from propositional manipulations and the locality of computa- 
tions, that (cu, 1p) & I/O-P&,(S), the required contradiction. 
5.4. Algebraic specifica tiom 
Algebraic specifications are the simplest of the first-order specifications. This 
operates in their favour as far as the theory and practice of specifying data types 
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is concerned, but against the needs of the subsequent proof theory. We will show 
that the i/o correctness theories fail to determine progra;n equivalence for a very 
simple programming system with an algebraic specification. 
5.8, Theorem. Let C be a signature composed of two unary functions ,f, g and a 
corxtant. Let K be the class of all E-structures satisfying the equation8 
fg(x) = gf(x) ==x. 
Then there exist flow-chart programs P, Q E PROG(C) SW8 that 
I/O-P&(P) =1/O-P&(Q) but P+KQ. 
The simplest possible counter-example is ruled out by the Singukr Case Lemma 
4.6 and the next simplest candidate is represented by ou:* Conjecture 4.2. Having 
two function symbols with no axioms as a counter-exa.mple is ruled out by the 
Usual Case Lemma 4.4, so the variety diefined in Theorem 5.8 is probably the best 
for our purpose. Notiice that under their it?itial algebra semantics the equations 
define the inbeger arithmetic 
(Z; 0, x + 1, x - 1). 
Proof of Theorem 5.8. Let P compute the two argument projection function 
P(x, y) = x throughout EC. For Q we require that 
‘(” ‘) = (znde fined, 
if (n) or ( y) is finitte or x E ( y) 017 y E (x), 
otherwise. 
Given the defining equations for K9 it . straightforwra-d to design a flow-chart 
program to play the rdle of Q. Clearly, P Y+ Q* 
Assume, for a contradiction, that the i/o correctness theories are: distinct. Since 
I/O-P&(P) c I/O-PCK(Q), let Q! = CY(X, y) and @ = 0(x, y, z) E Z(Z) such that 
K k {a}Q{@ and K F{LY}.P{P). 
Applying the known properties of P and Q, these expressions simplify to 
Set Y(X, 
kf~a(x,~)-,[(Q(x,~)J,nS(x,~))vQ(x, y)Tl, 
KFa((x, y)-qtx, y). 
v) = Q! (x, y) A +(K, y) and observe that for each A E K, a, & E A 
A kc y(a, b) implies Q(a, b)? 
and, therefore, 
A t= y(a, b) implies (a) and (b) are infinite, and a& @I), bag (a). 
Our hypotheses allow us to choose such an A E K and elements CI, K E A and it is 
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to this step we find a contradiction by means of the Compactness Theorem, Theorelm 
1.3.22 in [7]. 
Let L -.5?(C) and add to it a constant symbol uz to obtain L(a). Then 
$a, b) and for each b E (A, a), (A, a) I= y(a, 6) implies Q(a, b)?. 
Set T = Th(A, a), the set of all sentences of &(a) true in (A, a). Next we add a 
new constant symbol b to L(a) and define the following set of sentences from &(a, b): 
T’ = (1 y (a, b), (b) IS infinite, b& (a)}. 
It is easy to express the statements in quotation marks given the special definition 
of PC. 
By a routine application of the Compactness Theorem, the set of sentences 
T II T’ can be shown to have a model B E K. In such a B there are elements a, b, 
c such that 
B I= yCa, b) and B t= 1 y(a, c). 
‘we now use the following fact which is easy to prove from the specifications of K: 
if A E K and a, 6, c E A are such that (b) and (c) are infinite, and a, b, c do not 
appear in one another’s subalgebras, then there is some 4 E Aut(A) for which 
&a J == a and 4(b) = c. Therefore, 6, c E B can be exchanged, by an automorphism 
fixing a, in the pair of valid formulae above. And this is the sought for contradiction. 
5.5 Complete first-order specifications 
By a complete axiontatisable clans we mean the class K = ALG(Z, E) of all models 
of a first-order theory (2, E) having the property that for every sentence 4 of 5?(C) 
either & or -74 is provable from E. By an w-categorical axiomatisable class we 
mean an axiomatisable class K -= ALG(C, E) having the property that any two 
countably infinite models in K are isjomorphic. 
Complete classes arise in two wa$. First, the implicit specifications (C, Th(A)) 
in Hoare’s logic are complete first-order theories; this is obvious. Secondly, the 
familiar numerical data. types W, the reals R and complex numbers @ have natural 
first-order axiomatisations (C, Ej in the theories of Presburger Arithmetic, real 
closed fields and algebraically c!iosecl fields, all of which are complete. 
Programming systems whose data type semantics form such classes are par- 
ticularly well characterised by thei.r c’omplete first-order specifications from the 
points of view of both proof theory and theory of their countable models (see 
Section 2.3 of [7]; notice how several kinds of models distinguished by their 
morphism properties prove to be unique up to isomorphism). We will prove 
5.9, Theorem. Let K be a complete axiomatisable class of C-structures and let 
P, Q E PROG(C). Tfren the following properties are equivaht : 
(i) I/O-PC&P) == I/O-PC&Q); 
(ii) for some countable A E K, P =A Q ; 
(iii) for some countable A E K, I/O-PCA(P) = l/O-PCA(Q). 
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Yet, the i/o-correctness theories fail to determine program equivalence for 
complete classes. In the next section we will prove the fOllOWirig important fact: 
5.10. Tkorem. Let K be the class of all C arith structures elementary equivdent to 
the standtxrd modei of arithmetic N Then there exist P, Q E PRQG(.Xarith) such that 
Determinateness for complete classes can be neatly expressed in terms of a logic 
of effcctiwe definitions LED developed by Tiuryn in [33] where it is equivalent to 
the condition on a class being V-LED complete. 
Assuming the truth of Theorem 5.9 it is easy to obtain this positive result about 
w-categorical axiomatisable classes, however. 
S.II_. Corolky. Let M be ’ an w-categorical axtmaitisable cimws of C-strwtuc’es 
having an infinite er’ement but having no fini&? elements. Therl for any P, Q E 
PROG(C) 
I/O-P& (1’) = I/O-PCK (Q) implies @ =[<Q.. 
Proof. Assume the correctness theories coincide. By the #o4-Vaugh? Tect (Theorem 
Xl.10 irn [7]), K is complete. rEy Theorem 5.8 there is; a cou.mtabl;l iijfinite structure 
A E K such that P =AQ. Let & be the class of all countable K’-s%uctures. Since 
each structure in K0 is isomorphic to A we know that P=K,,Q. Thus, by the 
Countability Lemma 5.6, P = K Q. 
Proof of Theorem 5.9. First we prove that ( 1) implies t-2). Now fat- A E K, P =A Q 
if, and only if, for no a f A” any one of the following are true: 
(i) forsome& IEO,A~=COM?&&I CQMP&.J)A OUT~,r:(n)#OUT~.,(a!; 
(ii) for some k, ,4 t=COMP~~,k(a) nd for all 1 E to, A FCOMf~ ,(a), 
(iii) for some I, A i== COMP&z) and for all k E w, A F COMPP,, (a). 
Clearly (i) is irrelevant for, in the presence of the hypothesis I/O-PCK (19) = 
I/O-PC&Q), when. P and Q converge their outputs must coincide. Thus, we 
rephrase the situation as Eollows: let 
Tp,:k (x) = (COMP v,&); ~COMP&x8: 1 E w}, 
Then for any ,4 E K. P =A Q if, and only if, no a E ,4” satisfies or mdises either we 
of the types Tll,&), TG,,(x). (This is standard terminology in mode! theory.) 
To prove (2) we look for some countable A E K which omits these types. 
Because K is complete we can appIy the Extended Omitting Types Theorem 
(Theorem 2.2.15 in [7]) so that it is sufficient to prove By locallly oaits these types. 
142 LA. Bergstra. 1: Tiuryn, J. K Tucker 
Suppose, for a contradljction, that ‘?“p,,( X) is locally realised. Then there is a 
formula 8 consistent with K and such that 
Kke(x)+COMP &r) and K b 6(x) + -KDMPo,,(x) for 1 E o. 
We claim the contradiction that (0(x), false) lies in I/G-PCK (Q) but not in I/O- 
P&(P). This is easy to s(:e: let A E h& a E A’“. If A I= or(a) then Q(a)? and hence 
Thus K l=={6}Q(~a~~e’) a!:td since, trivially, A I== @(a) entails P(a)& we have 
K tP {B)P(false). Applying: the same argument o 7”&(x) shows all the types are 
locally omitted and the implication is proved. 
NOW, that (2) implies (3) is obvious, And we conclude with a lemma which 
demonstrates that (3) implies (1). 
5.12. Lemma. Let .K be a complete axiomathable class of C-structures and let 
S E PROG(.Z). The for each A e K 
I/O-PC/@) = I/O_PCK (S)l. 
Proof. Since A tz JC, I/O-PC&) c I/O-PC,(S). For the reverse inclusion, suppose 
for a contradiction that the theories are distinct. There exist formulae cy = a(x), 
/3 = p(x, y) such that A I= (LY}S{@} but for some R E K, b E B” we have S(b)i and 
Bkar(b)A lp(b, S(b)). Let IS(b)1 = t and definpw 
e(~) = tt(~j A COMP& j A I~(x, OUTS,,@)). 
Now, clearly, B I= B(b) and B k 3x . e(x). Since K is defined by a complete theory 
E we have E I-- 3x . O(x). Therefore, as A HZ, wt= have that A I=& . e(x) which 
by the construction of 8 contradicts A k{a}S{&. 
6. Arithmetiie programs 
The programs of AP = PROG(&,h) we will henceforth call arithmetic programs. 
The purpose of arithmetic programs is to compute recursive functions on the set 
o and, semantically, it seems reasonable to insist that one’s interest in them is 
confined to the (unspecified) programming system [N, AP] where N is the standard 
model of arithmetic. This is not acceptable, however. Although we know, from 
Lemma 2.1, that the correctness theories determine program equivalence for 
[N, AP] we also know that Hoare logics for partial correctness do not operate 
without some first-order specification of 1B’ acting as an interface between data 
type and proof theory. Thus the extensive collections of proof rules for programming 
constructs and the studies of their completeness properties in the monograph [33, 
for example, pertain not to [ AP] but to [@NT, AP] where CNT is the class of 
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all models of ThUV), so called compl’etc7 ~tumber theory. Here, of course, we have 
natural Hoare logics which are compllete and so syntactically define the correctness 
theories but, in their turn, the correctness theories fail to determ& pr’ogram 
equivalence (Theorem 5.10 which we prove here). Even if this latter state of affaiss 
were not the case then the fact that the specification Th(N) is wot even arithmetical, 
having Turing degree 0”, forces a difficult compromise with our expectations about 
data type specifications. 
Let us consider an alternate method of casting arithmetical computations in the 
form of a programming system. As is well known, the class -IVY of all while-programs 
can compute all recursive functions on w using a set of primitives smaller than 
c arith 9 l it is sufficient to use C = (0, SUCC). The axioms ofi Presburger over 2 form 
a specification (2, E) which is recursive, complete and whose set of consequences 
is even decidable. Let PrA = ALG(C, E). The %-s: &Rcufty encountered by Floyd’s 
principle is that [PrA, *?KI(ZJ] fails to possess any reasonable Hoare logic which 
is sound and complete for proving partial correctness (see Bergrstra and Tucker [5]). 
Having introduced, and discounted, CNT and PrA a!; candidates fit to support 
arithmetical computation in a programming system, there is but one more firs:-order 
specification which ought to be tried: Peano’s axioms. Let PA denote the ciass of 
all models of Peano arithmetic. Most regrettably, we have been unable to prove 
that the i/o-correctness theories determine program equivalence over PA. Thus, 
our first task is to offer an open problem and an opi:lion: 
6.1. Conjecture. For any arithmetic programs P, Q 
I/O-P&A(P) = I/O-P&&2) implies P=PR Q. 
We can provide, however, the following partial result. 
Let n&V) be the set of all universal first- :?rder s::ntences over #Zarith true in the 
standard model of arithmetic N. Now let K be the subclass of those models in PA 
which, in addition, satisfy vi(N). Clearly, CNT is a subclass of K. 
6.2. Theorem. For any arithmetic programs P, Q 
I/O-PC~,#) = I/O-PCpA(Q) implies P +Q. 
Before proving Theorem 6.2, we shall explain why it is of any interest iin these 
discussions. First, observe that it is easy to show 
6.3. Theorem. For any ar2hmetical programs F, Q 
I/O-P&(P) = I/O-PC&Q) implies P =_.uQ. 
So the point at issue is that there is interesting izfcrmation t;’ be had about 
programs computing on by cons,idering their behavicur ovea’ K. This next theor 
will show that programs on N, equivalent up to theit input-ou[~ut semantic!: over 
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can be detected as operationally distinct over N from the inequivalence of their 
input-output se’man tics over K. 
6.4, ThecPwn. Let P, Q be arithmetic programs. Suppose that P=NQ but that 
P $ K Q. Then )the relative run times of P atid’ Q OtJer N are unbounded in the se(nse 
that for any t E o there exists an input a E A” such that 
Proof, First suppose that for some A E K, a E A” it is the case that P(a)&, Q(a)& 
but P(a) f Q(a). .t;=t fP(a>l = k and IQ(a)1 = I so ti-tiai 
A:c COMPp,k(a) A COMP&a) A OUTP,& 1 f OUT&a). 
Now since all of rl(N) is satisfied in A, 
N t= 3x e [GOMPpVk (x) A COMPo,! (x) A OUTP,k (x) # OUTo,l (x )] 
whence it follows that P, Q differ somewhere on N. As this contradicts p =NQ we 
may assume that for some A E K, a E A” it is the case that P(a)& but Q(a)t (say). 
Define &,~(x)=CO!W&x) A r\f=, --ZOMPQJX). If, again, IP( = k then for 
each 2 E w, A t= 3x . &J(X). As this is an existential sentence and Al== 7~1(N) we 
deduce that N /= ax . &J(X) for each 2 E or). Giv.en t choose any k, I E w such that 
I > tk and choose a E N” such that N I= &,[(a). Then 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Contrapositivekj, assume P*KQ. If P +NQ then we are 
done by Theorem 6<3; so assume P= I&. This is the hypothesis of Theorem 6.4 
and, using its proof5 we may further assume that. somewhere in K, P converges 
whilst Q diverges. Moreover, we can choose k E w such that for all 2 EW, 
NJ= 3x , &,i(x) where &,[(x) is the for\;nula defined above. 
Let (3(z) be a formula such that 
(i) ZJz g 4(z) is satisifiied somewhere in PA; ancl 
(ii) for any 1M E PA, m E 1M if kf I= (b(m) then ~1 is a non-standard element of 
M. Such a formula exists by Godel’s Iricompleteness Theorem. 
There are now two cases to the proof, one ,Df which must hold since ‘32 . 4(z) 
is consistent with PA. Let COMPo( 9:, x) be a first-order representation of the 
sequence (COMP&x): 2 c 0). 
CaseI: 32. 4(z) A 3x[COMPp,k(x) A (Vy c z) . lCOMPo( y, x)]] is satisfied in 
PA. Then -se claim that with 
CU(X)G~Z l [4(Z)n COMPp,k(.X) A (Vy <i*) . -RCOMP~(Y, x)], 
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we have PA k {(u}Q{p} but PA t# {a}P{P}. T 0 see the first asserted program is valid 
is to notice its preccladition can be satisfied, in which case it implies t31e divergence 
of Q. To ser= the second asserted program is not valid is lo notice its precondition 
implies the convergence of F. 
8’6lse 2: Vz o [4(z) + Vx . [COMPp,&) + (Vy <: z) . COMPo( y, x)]] is satisfied in 
PA. 
Let H(x) stand for ‘“the least y, if any exist, such that COMP& y, x)“. Assuming, 
M~K,m~~and~~4(m)thenforanya~rt.l”, 
and sup{W(a): 1Ml= COMP,&z ,) exists. Let this supremulm be defined by formllrla 
v,(s). Define a(x) = S.&z) A 3s. [ylc is) A (Vy <s) n lCOMPo( y, x)]. 
We claim that PA != {(u )Q(fahe) but PA F {cY}P{faise}. Consider the first asserted 
program. The formula ‘yk(s) entails that s exceeds the lenpth~ of all computations 
of Q on inputs satisfying CO:NIPp,Jx!. In particular, J exceeds all standard numbers 
as these computations ztiy have arbitrarily large stand,ard lengths on standard 
inputs. It fol!ows that the precondition implies Q diverges and we are done. 
On the other hand, the second assertion program is invalid in PA because 
3x . a(x) is satisfied and the prticondition implies the convergence of P. 
To illustrate, iita nother way, the dependence of our problem on thL specifications 
and the semantics they determine, we shall fix two arithmetic programs and consider 
their correctness theories through 4 changes of programmiing system. ILet 
P(x) E x := 0, 
Q(x) ~5 while x # 0 do .X := PRED(x) od 
where PRED is the name reserved for the predecessor function on N. ir:learly, 
F’ =NQ. Let 21 x (0, PRED} c 2Yarith. F or any class K of 251 -structures we have 
I/O-P& (P) c: I/O-P&: (0) 
On the other hand, it is easy to think of K where PY+Q lbecause Q need not 
J terminate. In the 4 systems to .o llow this will be so, but the correctness theories 
will not always renlain distinct. This exercise wirI;s the vacillations of determinateness 
is a miniature of our study of specifications. 
6.5. Example. lXvia1 spxificatians. Consider P, C? as belonging to the system 
[(&, 8), PROG(X,)] and set & = ALG<&) the class of all &-structures. When we 
studied ‘trivial’ programming systetms in Section 4 we were zmable to settle determin- 
ateness in this ~1s~ (remember Conjecture 4.2). However, the correctness theories 
_ j, r, Q are distinct, if for no interesting reason: set cy (x) 5~ {x f 0 A PR‘ED(x) = x)* 
Since for A E K1, a E A, A i= a! (a) forclss Q(a) to diverge we have 
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6.6. Example. Algebraic specifications. Set 22 = CI u{§UCC}. We will turn our 
integer specification of Theorem 5.8 intc a Horn formula specification of the natural 
numbers with successor and predecesst r. Let E be the set of axioms 
PRFD(O) = 0, 
X ,- 2 -J. PBED(X) f X, 
slucc~[x)#o, 
SUCC(X)#X, 
PRED(SUCC(X)) = X, 
X # 0 + SUCC(PIRED(X)) ‘= X. 
The proof of Theorem 5.8 may be: adapted, in a simple way, to prove the 
correctness theories of P and Q coincide. 
6.7. Exanspb. Peano A,rihnetic. Cokder P, Q as belonging to the system [PA, 
API. Alth,ough determinateness for this system is open it is easy to prove the 
correctness theories of P, Q are distinct. First note that P, Q differ on precisely 
the non-standard models in PA. By Codei’s fncomyleteness Theorem, there is a 
formula Q!(X), consistent *vith PA, such th;it for A4 E PA, m E M, M \= (Y (m) implies 
DZ is non-standard. It follows that 
6.8. Exampbe. Complete Number Theory. Consider P, Q as belongGig to the system 
[CNT, AP] w’here CNT is the subcla!;s of PA composed of those arithmetics atisfying 
Th(Nj. We will prove that 
which ako proves Theorem 5.10. 
Suppose, for a c6;ntradiction, the correctness theories are distinct. It is, by now, 
easy to see how ta3 choose a formula n(x), consistent with CNT, such that for 
M E CNT, m E M, A4 t= a(m) implies 49(m) j’. As Th(N) is a complete theory, 
Th@?)k- 3x. tr(.x) and A+ 3x. a(x). Thus, t&f-e is rut EN such that Q(n)? which 
by the definition of U is impossible. 
Applzndix 
In this applendix we prove the Localisatb? Lemma 5.3 and Lemmas 5.4, 5.5. 
roof of the Localisation Lennnna 5.3. Remember that the Convergency Lemma 
2.3 said that the local condition (ii) in the statement of Lemma 5.3 on a class K 
was sufficienrt for the partia1 correctness theories P&(S) to determine program 
equivalence over K. By Lemma 5.2, the condition is sufficient for the i/o correctness 
theories, 
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Assume the i/o correctness theories determine prograrn equivalence over the 
class K. Let S be a closed program over the signature C(c)/ =X u {cl, . . . , c,,} and 
suppose S diverges somewhere in K. We must make a trivial cam diistinction 
between tl f Id and n = 0. 
Let a # 0 and let S = SO(cI, . . . , c,*) where S&1,. . . , x,) is a program over C 
with uninitialised input variables x 1, . . . 9 x,,, We define P, Q E FVXOG@) a:s pro- 
grams abbreviating 
Rx1 , . . . ,&)==XB, 
Oh , . . . ,x,)=if S&I,. e., x,&hen xl else diverge fi 
Clearly, P s+Q siEce P is everywhere convergent whereas Q is not because So 
diverges by hypothesis. By their definition, I/O-PCK (P) c I/CWCpc (Q) thus the 
determinateness assumption (i) implies there is a pair of formulae a, g such that 
The first-order sentence 8 required in condition (ii‘3 is 
the consistency and divergence property of -which are easy to check. 
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Lemma 5.3 yields one implication immediately without 
recourse to the hypothesis that the i/o total correctness theories agree;. 
Assume P, Q to De programs over K and that I/O-T&(P) = I/0 r&(Q). We 
shall deduce that 
P&(P) = PCK (Q) implies I/O-PCk (P) = I/O-P& (Q). 
Contrapositively, suppose there is some Q! = a!(x), /3 = p(x, v) such that 
K k{a)Pg3) and K w (a)Q{P}e 
Choose some A EX and a E A” such that Q(a)& and 
A +=(a) .f lP(a, Q(a)). 
Using the Definability Lemma 1.3 we can express the computation Qia) in the 
first-order formula COMPC&) and polynomial OUT&x) for t = lQQd/: 
A /=COMP’&a) and A ~=COBMPC&) implies Q(6) = OLTT&4 
!Jotice that the pa;r 
(COMPQ,~), y = OUT&x)i E I/O-T&(Q). 
Consider now the pair 
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Obviously, this pair does not. belong to PC&: (Q) because it is invalid on our 
chosen A. However it does lie in PCK (P’). To see this let W E K and tT E B” and assume 
B I= COMPQ,,(b) A 1p (b, OLJTo,,(bj). 
The hypothesis on i/o total correctness thenpries implies 
(COMP&x)l, y = OUT&x)) E I/O-TCK (P). 
Thus F(b) = OUTQ,,(~) from which we ma:: deduce 
B l=COMP&b) A -@(b, OLJTQ,,:bj’j + [(P(b j& A false) v P(b)?]. 
Since B and b were arbitrarily chosen we 2.~ done. 
Proof of Lemma 5.5, We want a class K and program P, Q over K whose i/o 
partial correctness theories agree but whose i/o total correctness theories are 
distinct. Example 6.7 will do nicely. Ths: programs there defined over Peano 
Arithmetic we showed to have the same i/o partial correctness theories. To see 
dhst their i/o total correctness theories are not the same observe rh;tt (true, true) 
hes in I/O-T&(P) but not in I/O-TC&Q. 
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